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Aristotle’s Protrepticus sought to exhort its audience to engage in philosophy 
(filosofi&a), i.e., the “acquisition and use of wisdom” (kth~si&v te kai_ xrh~siv sofi&av: 6, 
40.2-3/B53; cf. 6, 37.7-9/B8).1 The Protrepticus is now lost. But work by D.S. Hutchinson 
and Monte Ransome Johnson (2005) has confirmed earlier speculation – initiated by 
Ingram Bywater (1869) – that Iamblichus preserves large passages of the work in his own 
Protrepticus. Hutchinson and Johnson 2018 argue that significant portions of the 
Protrepticus also appear in Iamblichus’ De Communi Mathematica Scientia (DCMS), and 
that the Protrepticus was originally a dialogue.  
In passages preserved in Chapter 6 of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus (at 40.15-41.2/B55-
56), Aristotle offers three linked arguments for the claim that philosophy is easy. (I number 
the arguments in the translation that follows.) 
[1] For, with no pay coming from people to those who philosophize, on account of 
which [the latter] would have labored strenuously in this way, and with a great lead 
extended to the other arts, nevertheless their passing [the other arts] in exactness 
despite running a short time seems to me to be a sign of the easiness about 
philosophy. [2] And further, everybody’s feeling at home in it and wishing to 
occupy leisure with it, leaving aside all else, is no small sign that the close attention 
comes with pleasure; for no one is willing to labor for a long time. [3] And the use 
[of wisdom] differs most from all others [i.e., all other arts and sciences]; for 
[philosophers] are in need neither of tools nor of places for their productive work; 
                                               
1 I use Pistelli’s 1888 edition of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus. I cite passages primarily by 
reference to the Pistelli chapter, page, and line number, and then by the “B” numbering 
used in Düring’s 1961 reconstruction. For the DCMS, I use Festa’s 1891 edition. I have 
consulted various translations (Düring’s, as well as Hutchinson and Johnson’s excellent 
reconstruction-in-progress), but translations unless otherwise noted are my own. 
 2 
rather, wherever in the inhabited world anyone sets down thought, it touches on the 
truth as if it were equally present everywhere.2 
 
 
These linked arguments – which I call (1) the progress argument, (2) the pleasure argument, 
and (3) the resource argument – also appear in verbatim parallel passages of Chapter 26 of 
Iamblichus’ DCMS  (82.17-83.2). These Aristotelian arguments are as striking as they have 
been underexplored.  
In appealing to, and defending, philosophy’s easiness in a protreptic work, 
however, Aristotle faces an obvious worry – a normative worry that arises independently 
of the precise content of these arguments. In turning its audience toward an end or pursuit, 
a protreptic aims to establish that end or pursuit’s choiceworthiness. In the Protrepticus, 
Aristotle aims, more specifically, to establish that philosophy is choiceworthy for its own 
sake (7, 43.12-25/B68-69; 9, 51.8-15/B18-19; 9, 51.16-52.5/B17; 9, 52.16-20/B42; 9, 
53.15-26/B44; cf. DCMS 23, 70.26-71.4). But easiness, the worry goes, has only a tenuous 
link with the sort of choiceworthiness that Aristotle attributes to philosophy. This obvious 
normative worry has three parts: 
(1) The Sufficiency of Easiness?: According to Aristotle, sleeping with another’s 
wife, wounding others, and bribing officials are all easy (EN v 9.1137a6-9). Yet these, and 
many other, easy activities lack choiceworthiness for their own sakes. So, easiness is not 
sufficient for such choiceworthiness.  
                                               
2 [1] To_ ga_r mh&te misqou~ para_ tw~n a)nqrw&pwn gignome/nou toi=j filosofou~si, di' o4n 
sunto&nwj ou3twj a2n diaponh&seian, polu& ge proeme/nouj ei0j ta_j a1llaj te/xnaj 
o3mwj e0c o)li/gou xro&nou qe/ontaj proelhluqe/nai tai=j a)kribei/aij, shmei=o&n moi dokei= 
th~j peri\ th_n filosofi/an ei]nai r(a|stw&nhj. [2]  1Eti de\ to_ pa&ntaj filoxwrei=n e0p' 
au)th|~ kai\ bou&lesqai sxola&zein a)feme/nouj tw~n a1llwn a(pa&ntwn, ou) mikro_n 
tekmh&rion o3ti meq' h(donh~j h( prosedrei/a gi/gnetai: ponei=n ga_r ou)dei\j e0qe/lei polu_n 
xro&non. [3] pro_j de\ tou&toij h( xrh~sij plei=ston diafe/rei pa&ntwn: ou)de\ ga_r de/ontai 
pro_j th_n e0rgasi/an o)rga&nwn ou)de\ to&pwn, a1ll' o3ph| tij a2n qh|~ th~j oi0koume/nhj th_n 
dia&noian, o(moi/wj pantaxo&qen w3sper parou&shj a3ptetai th~j a)lhqei/aj.  
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(2) The Necessity of Easiness?: Aristotle identifies certain difficult activities as 
good and choiceworthy for their own sakes. Consider, for instance, his remarks on ethically 
virtuous action. Hitting the intermediate – in the right way, at the right time – is “not for 
everyone, nor easy; hence, the ‘well’ is rare and praiseworthy and fine” (EN ii 9.1109a28-
30; cf. ii 6.1106b31-33; ii 9.1109b14-16; iv 11.1126a32-b9; viii 4.1156b25; ix 10.1171a19-
20; Magna Moralia i 9.1186b32-a4). Similarly, being just is not easy (EN v 9.1137a5-6). 
So, difficulty seemingly does not preclude – and easiness is apparently not required for – 
choiceworthiness as an end.3   
(3) The Superiority of the Difficult?: Aristotle occasionally identifies what is more 
difficult as greater (mei~zon), or more valuable, than what is easier. “And in general the more 
difficult is [greater] than the easier; for it is rarer” (kai_ o#lwv to_ xalepw&teron tou~ 
r(a&|onov : spaniw&teron ga&r: Rhetoric i 7.1364a29). Likewise: “The more conspicuous 
[is more valuable] than the less [conspicuous], and the more difficult [is more valuable than 
the less difficult]. For we appreciate more having that which is not easily acquired” (to_ 
e)pifane&steron tou~ h(~tton toiou&tou, kai_ to_ xalepw&teron: ma~llon ga_r a)gapw~men 
e!xontev a$ mh_ e!sti r(a|di&wv labei~n: Topics iii 2.117b29-30). 
In sum, easiness is neither sufficient nor necessary for choiceworthiness as an end; 
moreover, what is difficult appears to be more valuable than what is easy. Therefore – this 
obvious normative worry goes – if the Protrepticus seeks to exhort its audience to pursue 
philosophy on the basis of philosophy’s easiness, then the Protrepticus provides the wrong 
sort of hortatory appeal. Philosophy’s easiness is one matter, philosophy’s 
choiceworthiness as an end, another. Those whom Aristotle must persuade to philosophize 
on the basis of philosophy’s easiness, the thought goes, might seem dubious candidates for 
philosophers. Hence, the Protrepticus’ easiness arguments confront us with the puzzle of 
                                               
3 For the thought that fine things are difficult, cf. Plato, Republic iv 435c; vi 497d; Cratylus 
384a-b; Hippias Major 304e. On the different ways Socrates tries to exhort his various 
students with the claim that “fine things are difficult,” see Mintz 2010. 
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understanding what philosophy’s easiness has to do with its choiceworthiness for its own 
sake, and, therefore, of why Aristotle appeals to philosophy’s easiness in a protreptic work.4 
The Protrepticus’ easiness arguments themselves raise multiple philosophical 
questions. For the purposes of this paper, however, it suffices to understand why Aristotle 
appeals to easiness in a protreptic work. I briefly situate the Protrepticus’ easiness 
arguments in their dialectical context. On this basis, I elucidate what sort of easiness 
Aristotle attributes to philosophy, what difference philosophy’s easiness makes to its 
choiceworthiness as an end, and how Aristotle can respond to the tripartite obvious 
normative worry just articulated.  
 
I. Understanding Isocrates’ Demandingness Worry 
I begin with the commonly accepted proposal that, in the Protrepticus, Aristotle aims to 
respond to a set of challenges from Isocrates, a thinker who opposed Plato and Aristotle’s 
theoretical conception of philosophy in favor of a model of philosophy focused on the art 
of rhetoric.5 One need not accept Hutchinson and Johnson’s proposal that the Protrepticus 
was originally a dialogue, strictly speaking, to agree that the Protrepticus incorporates 
distinct Isocratean, Aristotelian, and Pythagorean voices.6 In DCMS 26, 79.5-15, which 
Hutchinson and Johnson now attribute to Aristotle’s Protrepticus, an Isocratean voice 
addresses the views of rival philosophers. Some philosophers, the Isocratean voice says, 
pursue the sort of scientific understanding of nature sought by Anaxagoras and Parmenides. 
Other philosophers seek a theoretically grounded account of the just and the good. 
                                               
4 Thanks to Jerry Green for questions on these passages. On the philosopher’s “love of 
labor” (filoponi&a), see Plato, Republic vii 535d. 
5 See, e.g., Einarson 1936: 272-278; Düring 1961: 20-24, 33-35; Jaeger 1962: 55-60; Van 
der Meeren 2011: xxvi-xxx; Wareh 2012: 41-42; Collins 2015: 244-245, 255-257; 
Hutchinson and Johnson unpublished work B.   
6 Cf. Collins 2015: 245; Wareh 2012: 17.   
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Nevertheless, these rival conceptions of philosophy, the Isocratean voice contends, prove 
useless and not worth the effort. 
I note the similarity of DCMS 26, 79.5-15 to passages in Isocrates’ corpus –  
in particular, to passages in the Antidosis, a work with which Aristotle shows explicit 
familiarity in the Rhetoric.7 In the Antidosis, Isocrates opposes rival – that is, theoretical – 
philosophers, who focus on “astronomy and geometry and studies of that sort” (261).8 Such 
philosophers seek an understanding beyond the grasp of finite human beings: such 
philosophers “promise to make their disciples all but immortal” (Against the Sophists 4). 
Yet human beings are finite, and such investigations ill suit human nature. Hence, Isocrates 
implores, students should not “allow their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, 
nor stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists” (Antidosis 268).  
Given our human limitations, Isocrates thinks, theoretical investigations are simply 
impossible to complete successfully. On this basis, Isocrates rejects the very possibility of 
a theoretically grounded ethics: for “it is not in the nature of human beings (e)n th~| fu&sei 
th~| tw~n a)nqrw&pwn) to attain an understanding by the possession of which we can know 
positively what we should do or what we should say” (Antidosis 271). 9  Similarly, 
theoretical investigations into the fundamental nature of reality show no signs of attaining 
the understanding that they seek. Instead, such investigations break down into interminable, 
                                               
7 Cf. Antidosis 173 and Rhetoric II.23, 1399b9-11; cf. Antidosis 132-139; 141-149 and 
Rhetoric iii 17.1418b27. See Hutchinson and Johnson unpublished work B on the 
Rhetoric’s quotation of the Antidosis. On references to Isocrates’ works throughout the 
Rhetoric, see Veteikis 2011. Plato, meanwhile, was also familiar with Isocratean worries 
about Academic philosophy: see Phaedrus 278e-279b; Gorgias 463a (cf. Against the 
Sophists 17), 484c-485d (cf. Antidosis 267-268). 
8 Translations of Isocrates are from the Loeb editions, sometimes with slight emendation. 
9 Here, Isocrates conflates two views: (a) that no kind of knowledge can issue precise 
prescriptions for particular situations (see Antidosis 184) and (b) that no kind of knowledge 
can inform action (see Against the Sophists 2-4). Aristotle agrees with Isocrates on (a): see, 
e.g., EN i 3.1094b13-27; vi 1.1139a6-17; vi 5.1140a33-b4. But Aristotle disagrees with 
Isocrates on (b): see, especially, Protrepticus 10 (and Walker 2018: 145-150). On 
Aristotle’s agreements and disagreements with Isocrates, see Depew 2004: 169-173 and 
Wareh 2012: ch. 1. 
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“eristic” disputes (Antidosis 84; Panathenaicus 26-29; Against the Sophists 1; Helen 1-6). 
Some theoretical philosophers, such as Empedocles, contend that there are four basic 
elements in nature; others, such as Gorgias, deny that there are any (Antidosis 268). Such 
theoretical inquiries, however, are “vain” (Antidosis 269), and evidently unsuccessful in 
their own aims. In a key sense, and in virtue of our human limitations, then, theoretical 
philosophy is an impossible enterprise. Such philosophizing sufficiently overstrains our 
capacities. Hence, Isocrates thinks, rival theoretical conceptions of philosophy are 
excessively demanding, and inevitably too toilsome and laborious to be fitting objects of 
diligent pursuit for their own sakes. Call this Isocrates’ demandingness worry about rival 
theoretical conceptions of philosophy.  
According to the Antidosis, true philosophy consists in those studies that enable a 
student to be wise. Wisdom, in turn, consists in the capacity to speak well, where such 
speaking constitutes the perfection of the student’s capacities for thought, especially in 
practical affairs (255; 285).10 Again, Isocrates criticizes the theoretical studies that his 
rivals emphasize for pursuing an impossible task. Yet Isocrates allows that such studies can 
benefit students, though in a limited, incidental way, and only with significant qualification 
(261). Laboring through (diaponhqe&ntev) such studies and the exact reasoning that they 
display, like laboring through grammar and music, Isocrates grants, can sharpen our minds. 
Hence, they can prepare us to handle “easily” (r(a~|on) the cognitive tasks that Isocrates 
views as more useful and more valuable (265). At best, however, these theoretical studies 
constitute a “gymnastic of the soul and preparation for philosophy” (gumnasi&an…th~v 
yuxh~v kai_ paraskeuh_n filosofi&av) properly – that is, Isocratically – construed (266). 
Like other gymnastics, theoretical studies are overall laborious in themselves, only 
                                               
10 On Isocrates’ conception of philosophy, see Nightingale 1995: 26-28; Cooper 2004: 71-
77; Depew 2004; Wareh 2012; Collins 2015: 174-177. 
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instrumentally valuable, and injurious when pursued too long and too far. For Isocrates, 
such studies are surely too toilsome to be choiceworthy for their own sakes.   
To be clear, Isocrates admits that all types of knowledge are attained only “after 
great effort” (Antidosis 201), when good teachers habituate their students “to labor” for 
learning (ponei~n e)qi&zousi: Antidosis 184). Learning how to compose speeches demands 
“much study” (pollh~v e)pimelei&av dei~sqai: Against the Sophists 17). Thus, Isocrates 
bemoans that it is hard to persuade the young to look down upon a life of ease and instead 
apply themselves to philosophy in his favored sense (Antidosis 305). Likewise, Isocrates 
emphasizes the need to exert effort to become virtuous. Whereas hesitancy (or sloth) is a 
fault, a certain labor is commendable (To Demonicus 7-9, 21), as is a certain “love of labor” 
(filoponi&a: Panathenaicus 260).11 Still, defending his own conception of philosophy, 
Isocrates insists that grasping the “forms” out of which to compose speeches “is not 
altogether difficult” (ou)k ei)~nai tw~n pa&nu xalepw~n: Against the Sophists 16).  
Isocrates’ point raises an obvious question: since difficulty seems ineluctably 
relational (to an agent or class of agents), for whom does Isocrates believe that his rhetorical 
philosophy is “not altogether difficult”? Isocrates seems, in some passages, to offer a 
narrow answer to this question. He insists that people require the right nature if they are apt 
to excel at his art (Antidosis 186-187; cf. Against the Sophists 10, 17), and that natural 
ability is of greatest importance (Antidosis 189). Further, he suggests that only some are 
well provided by nature (pefuke&nai kalw~v) with the powers especially conducive to 
becoming a philosopher. These powers include the capacity to learn, a strong memory, a 
clear voice, and confidence (Antidosis 187-190). Hence, Isocrates, at points, seems to hold 
that rhetorical philosophy is “not altogether difficult” for that select group with the right 
nature for it. In other passages, however, Isocrates suggests a broader answer to this 
                                               
11 Again, on the philosopher’s filoponi&a, cf. Plato, Republic vii 535d. On Isocrates’ 
exhortations to hard work, see Wareh 2012: 32-33.  
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question. Whereas it does not belong to “the nature of human beings” to attain theoretical 
philosophy’s aims successfully (Antidosis 271), he says, rhetorical philosophy does not 
face this problem. For even if a rhetorical-philosophical education cannot make those 
without natural aptitude good debaters or speech-makers, this education can nevertheless 
improve them and make them “more wisely disposed” (fronimwte&rwv diakei~sqai: 
Against the Sophists 15). Indeed, Isocrates admits that, with experience and discipline, even 
those who are “less generously endowed by nature” (tou_v katadeeste&ran me_n tou&twn 
th_n fu&sin e!xontav) can excel those who are more endowed (Antidosis 191). Isocrates 
believes, then, that his own rhetorical philosophy is “not altogether difficult” (in particular) 
for those with the right nature for it. At the same time, Isocrates believes that such 
philosophy is “not altogether difficult” (more broadly) for human beings as such, provided 
that they take care to cultivate their abilities.12   
In sum, unlike his rivals’ theoretical philosophies, Isocrates suggests, his own 
rhetorical mode of philosophy is not excessively demanding. It is not completely difficult 
(i.e., impossible) for human beings as such. Nor is it overall difficult for human beings (i.e., 
capable of some qualified realization, but only at the cost of substantially greater toil). He 
thus denies that his model, in either way, amounts to sheer drudgery for those with, or 
without, special natural aptitude. At the same time, Isocrates does not try to pass off his 
model as completely easy, that is, as effortlessly simple for human beings as such. For 
philosophy, he admits, still requires some work and effort. Instead, Isocrates presents his 
own model as somewhat difficult, but overall easy. He grants that it imposes a certain labor. 
Yet he denies that this labor is significantly, or at all, greater than the one’s ability to realize 
this model. For those with special natural aptitude, his own model comes easier than it does 
                                               
12 Bradford 2015: 27-28 suggests that difficulty is always relative to an agent or class of 
agents. On Isocrates on the individual’s nature, see Wareh 2012: 27-34. 
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to those without such aptitude. Yet for both kinds of people, rhetorical philosophy, though 
requiring some work, remains generally feasible. 
 
II. Addressing the Normative Worry, Part (1): The Sufficiency of Easiness? 
With these points in mind, I now return to Aristotle. On the one hand, he defends theoretical 
philosophy as choiceworthy for its own sake. On the other hand, Aristotle confronts both 
Isocrates’ demandingness worry and Isocrates’ positive claims for the general feasibility of 
his alternative rhetorical model of philosophy. Within this dialectical context, Aristotle has 
good reason to argue that, for human beings as such, theoretical philosophy need not, by 
nature, constitute sheer drudgery. Aristotle, in other words, has good reason to show that 
such philosophy is neither (a) completely difficult nor (b) overall difficult. Instead, 
Aristotle has reason to show that philosophy is, in both ways, practicable. Indeed – 
apparently like Isocrates – Aristotle assumes that practicability (i.e., being dunato&v) is one 
of many necessary conditions for an activity’s being good or such-as-to-be-chosen 
(Rhetoric i 6.1363a20-21). And activities, he notes, are practicable in two ways (dixw~v), 
viz., insofar as they belong to the class of (i) the possible and (ii) the easy to perform (ta& 
te geno&mena a@n kai_ ta_ r(a|di&wv gigno&mena: 1363a21-23). Here, I take Aristotle to accept 
that such modes of practicability constitute a conjunctive necessary condition for an 
activity’s choiceworthiness, at least for its own sake.  
Accordingly, I introduce a distinction. When some activity is at least possible, it 
possesses weak practicability. In this case, the activity is not inconsistent with human 
nature; for human beings can perform it successfully. Yet that activity, even if possible, 
might still be overall difficult: it might still impose overall heavy costs of painful effort and 
time, the two markers of difficulty that Rhetoric i 6. 1363a23 highlights. Therefore, when 
an activity is at least overall easy to perform, it possesses strong practicability. In this case, 
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the activity need not require such heavy costs of painful effort and time. And so, instead, 
the activity positively accords with human nature.  
Suppose, then, that Aristotle can show that theoretical philosophy is both possible 
and easy to perform – i.e., that such philosophy possesses both weak and strong 
practicability. In this case, Aristotle can fully address Isocrates’ demandingness worry. For 
he can thereby show that theoretical philosophy is neither (a) completely difficult nor (b) 
somewhat easy, but overall difficult.13 Theoretical philosophy, contrary to Isocrates, can 
attain its ends of understanding. Further, it can serve as more than an onerous gymnastic of 
the soul possessing only qualified, instrumental choiceworthiness. Hence, Aristotle can 
argue, theoretical philosophy can be choiceworthy for its own sake. 
In conceding Isocrates’ assumption that excessive demandingness precludes 
something’s choiceworthiness for its own sake, and that both weak and strong practicability 
are necessary conditions for such choiceworthiness, Aristotle accepts a plausible view. For 
he then accepts the view that pursuits choiceworthy as ends should neither conflict with, 
nor otherwise overstrain, human powers. After all, he believes that our good consists in our 
being fully and virtuously active as the kinds of beings we are. Choiceworthy activities, 
then, must be possible for us. In-principle impossible tasks are not worth pursuing: they are 
pointless. Meanwhile, even if activities choiceworthy as ends inevitably impose some 
burdens on us, such activities should at least not be overall difficult. 14  Instead of 
overstraining human powers, they should be generally feasible for us as well. Any burdens 
                                               
13 When Topics iii 1.116b26 suggests, without explanation, that what is practicable is 
more choiceworthy than what is not practicable, I take Aristotle to mean that what is 
practicable is trivially more choiceworthy than what is not practicable, since weak 
practicability (at least) is a necessary condition of any choiceworthiness. 
14 Aristotle sometimes suggests that our good consists in approximating divinity as far as 
possible: see, e.g., EN x 7. 1177b27-33. As I argue in Walker 2018: 93-98, however, 
Aristotle means that we should approximate divinity – exercise our powers – as far as 
possible within the constraints of our human nature. The good we seek, Aristotle holds, is 
the human good (cf. EN i 7.1097a15 and 1098a16; i 13.1102a12-17). Thus, Aristotle’s 
exhortations to immortalize ourselves do not amount to exhortations either to accomplish 
the impossible or otherwise to overstrain our humanity. 
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that such activities impose should be compensated for, viz., by other, easiness-conducive 
features of the activities in question. Otherwise, the activities are overall toilsome, and, if 
considered as potential ends, unprofitable and wastes of vital effort. (Activities that are 
merely instrumentally choiceworthy – e.g., having painful medical surgery – may well be 
overall difficult, but still worth pursuing for other ends.) 
How, then, does Aristotle show that theoretical philosophy meets both the weak 
and the strong practicability conditions? Outside the Protrepticus, Aristotle rejects the 
thought that attaining philosophical understanding is impossible. By defending the in-
principle possibility of attaining philosophical understanding, then, Aristotle shows that 
theoretical philosophy meets the weak practicability condition. In Metaphysics A 
2.982b28-32, for instance, Aristotle considers the worry that wisdom (sofi&a) is not 
properly human, that gods alone are privileged to be wise, and that human beings should 
therefore content themselves with the understanding that accords with their abilities. In his 
discussion, Aristotle attributes this worry to Simonides.15 In response, Aristotle denies that 
                                               
15 Kurke 2011: 122 notes Aristotle’s transformation of the point of Simonides’ poem. 
According to parts of Simonides’ poem preserved in Plato’s Protagoras (341e), the 
privilege proper to the gods is not sophia, but utter perfection. Aristotle, then, imports 
Simonides’ view about the difficulties of becoming virtuous into Metaphysics A’s opening 
discussion of first philosophy.   
   Consider, further, the context in which Simonides’ poem comes up for discussion in the 
Protagoras. How can Simonides hold that it is hard for human beings to become good 
(339b), yet also cast doubt on Pittacus’ claim that it is hard to be good (339c)? In the 
Protagoras, Prodicus participates in the discussion, distinguishing becoming and being 
(340b). On this basis, and alluding to Hesiod’s Works and Days 287-319, Socrates suggests 
that while becoming good is hard, being good is easy (340d). The Protagoras’ references 
to Prodicus and Hesiod invite comparison with similar references in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia II.1.21-33 (=DK 84B2). Here, Xenophon’s Socrates alludes to Prodicus’ 
Choice of Heracles, in which Heracles finds himself faced with choosing between two 
roads, the road of Virtue, who presents herself as difficult, but rewarding, and the road of 
Vice, who promises to be easy. For its part, Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles, however, 
borrows and reinterprets Works and Days 287-319. Van der Meeren 2011: 109n10 notes 
some of these resonances. 
   While I focus on Isocrates’ criticisms of natural philosophy as providing the immediate 
context for Aristotle’s arguments in Protrepticus 6, the Isocrates-Aristotle dispute takes 
place against a larger background debate concerning the difficulties of virtue generally. On 
some of this background, see Wolfsdorf 2008; Beresford 2008 and 2009. I say more on 
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wisdom exceeds human capacities, and he asserts that the gods are pleased when human 
beings share in wisdom. To be sure, Aristotle goes on to write the Metaphysics, which 
develops first philosophy and shows, at least by example, that wisdom remains within 
human powers.16 Yet Metaphysics A 2 does not provide any argument explicitly defending 
the claims about wisdom that Aristotle asserts there. 
In the Protrepticus, however, Aristotle directly defends philosophy’s weak 
practicability. Aristotle’s defense begins with a general argument for the very possibility 
of philosophy, i.e., for the view that philosophizing successfully lies within human powers 
(6, 38.3-39.8/B31-36). Briefly, Aristotle argues that fundamental explanatory principles 
and causes are more understandable than that which they explain. Human beings by nature 
can understand all sorts of things. Therefore, a fortiori, they must be able to grasp 
fundamental explanatory principles and causes.   
This argument, if successful, shows that theoretical philosophizing successfully is 
at least possible. If so, such philosophy proves possible in a more complete sense than 
Isocrates allows. For we can successfully attain the understanding that our philosophizing 
seeks. Such philosophy, then, need not be excessively demanding in one respect: it need 
not be completely difficult, i.e., sheer toilsome wheel-spinning. Yet such philosophy, for all 
that, might remain excessively demanding in another respect: it might still remain overall 
difficult. And Aristotle is clear that wisdom, as a universal science whose objects are least 
open to our senses, does impose certain difficulties (Metaphysics A 2.982a23-25; cf. EN vi 
7.1141b6-8; Protrepticus 6, 38.14–22/B34; 7, 44.17–26/B76–77). Showing that theoretical 
philosophy possesses weak practicability and is possible does not yet show that such 
philosophy possesses strong practicability and is generally feasible.  
                                               
Aristotle’s stance concerning the difficulty of virtue in §IV below. (I thank an anonymous 
referee for calling attention to these matters.) 
16 I thank Ronald Polansky for this point. 
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Establishing theoretical philosophy’s general feasibility, and thereby responding 
completely to Isocrates’ demandingness objection, then, is the task of Protrepticus 6’s 
easiness arguments. Such arguments can admit that theoretical philosophy, requiring effort, 
is not effortlessly simple or completely easy. The difficulties that such philosophy imposes 
are real. Yet Aristotle’s arguments, if successful, show that such philosophizing need not, 
by itself, be even overall difficult. For if these arguments are successful, any difficulties 
with which philosophizing presents us can be outweighed and counteracted by 
philosophy’s compensating, easiness-conducive features. Such philosophy has features, as 
Aristotle argues, that have enabled it to outstrip the other arts in a short time, to be pleasant 
in leisure, and to attain its ends without requiring burdensome external resources. Even if 
theoretical philosophy is somewhat difficult, it remains overall easy – that is, generally 
feasible.17  
We can now respond to part (1) of the obvious normative worry, i.e., the thought 
that easiness does not suffice for an activity’s choiceworthiness for itself. Aristotle can 
agree: many vicious deeds may well be easy, but best avoided. By defending theoretical 
philosophy’s easiness, however, Aristotle need not be arguing that easiness is, all by itself, 
one of philosophy’s (unqualified) good-making features, or that one should philosophize 
for the sake of its easiness. Easiness is only a necessary condition for something’s 
choiceworthiness for its own sake. According to Protrepticus 7, philosophy is 
choiceworthy for its own sake because of its other features, including (a) its status as the 
function of our highest virtue and (b) its being the sort of activity through which we attain 
                                               
17  Demonstrating philosophy’s easiness thus accords with the independently sensible 
advice of the later, pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander, which recommends that 
protreptic arguments emphasize the easiness of the relevant end or pursuit (1, 1421b24; cf. 
3, 1426a1). The Rhetoric to Alexander is often attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. In 
virtue of multiple structural similarities between Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Rhetoric to 
Alexander, Mirhady 2007: 4-6 speculates that both Aristotle and Anaximenes may have 
borrowed from an earlier rhetoric handbook, perhaps by Theodorus of Byzantium. 
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the fullest degree of vitality.18 Further, in Protrepticus 10, Aristotle attributes utility to 
philosophy for deriving boundary markers of the human goods. (Thus, in his introductory 
remarks to Protrepticus 6, Iamblichus suggests that any costs that philosophy imposes with 
respect to difficulty will also turn out to be outweighed by the greatness of philosophy’s 
usefulness [37.22-26/B31].) In sum, Aristotle’s easiness arguments promise to show – 
contrary to Isocrates – that philosophy is not excessively demanding, and that human beings 
as such are naturally well suited for philosophy.   
 
III. Addressing the Normative Worry, Part (2): The Necessity of Easiness? 
This response, however, confronts Aristotle with part (2) of the obvious normative worry—
the thought that easiness does not, after all, seem to be necessary for something’s 
choiceworthiness as an end. Ethical virtue, it seems, is both difficult and choiceworthy for 
its own sake. At first blush, Aristotle might seem to portray ethical virtue in the way that 
Isocrates portrays philosophy, i.e., as overall difficult. It is hard, Aristotle says, to hit the 
intermediate with exceptional precision (EN ii 9.1109a34). For human beings find 
themselves, by nature, attracted to various pleasures (EN ii 8.1109a14-16). So, ethical 
virtue, even if possible, might still seem to overstrain human nature and lack strong 
practicability. But if so, then it is unclear how something’s choiceworthiness for its own 
sake depends on its easiness. And if ethical virtue can be choiceworthy as an end even if 
overall difficult, then, presumably, the same should hold for philosophy. Therefore, it is 
unclear why Aristotle should defend philosophy’s easiness.  
Yet I deny that Aristotle ultimately identifies ethical virtue as overall difficult in 
this sense. True, we face impediments to acquiring and exercising ethical virtue insofar as 
we must counteract certain tendencies that we possess qua animal. Chief among these 
impediments is our predisposition to pleasure. Moreover, given his views on natural 
                                               
18 On (a), see Protrepticus 7, 41.24-43.5/B61-67. On (b), see 7, 43.27-44.26/B71, 74-77. 
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character, Aristotle is committed to holding that becoming virtuous will be harder for some 
people than for others.19 Nevertheless, ethical virtue should not, in general, be overall 
difficult, either for those with good natures or for human beings as such. For Aristotle 
explicitly denies that we possess ethical virtue “contrary to nature” (para_ fu&sin: EN ii 
1.1103a24), at least in any strong sense. Instead, ethical virtue completes and manifests our 
human nature. For this reason, Aristotle affirms that happiness is available to all (pa~si) 
through a certain learning and care (EN i 9.1099b18-20).20 Ethical virtue, then, is not 
effortlessly simple. But it is only somewhat difficult, not overall difficult. And Aristotle 
identifies easiness-conducive features of ethical virtue that sufficiently compensate for any 
of these incidental difficulties. (Whether we actually all do commit ourselves to the learning 
and care happiness requires is, for Aristotle, another matter.) 
First, Aristotle highlights ways in which human beings can overcome any natural 
impediments to becoming ethically virtuous. In particular, good laws provide the right kind 
of nurture, especially when we are young, for counteracting our tendencies toward pleasure. 
Just as tilling the soil positively conduces to the seed’s growth, stabilizing a human soul 
early on through the influence of good laws positively conduces to the development of 
ethical virtue (EN x 9.1179b23-26). Aristotle makes a similar point in Protrepticus 9. 
Nature, Aristotle says, easily completes some tasks by herself, but other tasks only with 
difficulty. Some seeds germinate when unattended; but others require farming. So, too, 
some animals actualize their full nature unattended; but other animals – in particular, 
human beings – require the right nurture (50.2-12/B13). 
If such measures fail to benefit one early on, Aristotle recognizes, it is “difficult” 
(xalepo_n) for one to turn toward virtue later (EN x 9.1179b31-1180a1). For then, our 
animal predispositions toward pleasure remain obstacles to progress. When good laws and 
                                               
19 See Leunissen 2017: ch. 2, especially 48, 53. 
20 Those whom Aristotle identifies as natural slaves are presumably exceptions. 
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caregivers intervene in the early nurture and ethical development of the young, however, 
they make virtuous dispositions customary. Under such conditions, acquiring virtuous 
dispositions “will not be painful” (ou)k e!stai…luphra_) (1179b35). Something’s 
difficulty, however, consists, in part, in its painfulness (Rhet. i 6.1363a23-24). Therefore, 
given good laws and caretakers, developing virtuous dispositions should not be overall 
difficult.   
Second, Aristotle denies that exercising ethical virtue must be overall difficult. 
Granted, Aristotle admits the difficulty of finding the intermediate with extreme precision: 
this is not a task that everyone can perform (EN ii 9.1109a25-29). Yet immediately after 
making this point, Aristotle emphasizes that human beings have at hand a readily available 
“second sailing.” As practical agents, we can head toward the extreme opposed to that 
toward which we tend usually to drift  (EN ii 9.1109b1-7), and we can resist pleasure 
(1109b7-12). By doing so, Aristotle affirms, we will err less and will most of all succeed 
in finding the intermediate (1109b12-13). We will thereby find the intermediate in the 
“easiest” (r(a~|sta) way (1109b26). True, the “easiest” way to find the intermediate need 
not always be easy tout court, any more than the richest beggar is rich.21 But in the context, 
Aristotle identifies feasible ways in which agents can non-strenuously overcome obstacles 
to exercising virtue.  
Therefore, Aristotle thinks, acquiring and exercising ethical virtue is neither 
effortlessly simple nor completely easy. Instead, it is somewhat, but not overall, difficult. 
But notice, then, what type of difficulty Aristotle attributes to ethical virtue. An activity is 
generally feasible, as opposed to effortlessly simple, when it requires work, but when this 
work does not make the activity overall difficult. Consequently, the qualified difficulty that 
Aristotle attributes to ethical virtue turns out to be the same condition as ethical virtue’s 
general feasibility, only under a different description. Acquiring and exercising ethical 
                                               
21 I thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
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virtue is (somewhat) difficult (when compared to effortlessly simple tasks). And acquiring 
and exercising ethical virtue, as noted, may well be more difficult for some than for 
others.22 Yet these tasks remain (overall) easy (when compared to impossible or overall 
difficult tasks).   
In short, Aristotle does identify ethical virtue as difficult, but still choiceworthy for 
its own sake. Ethical virtue’s particular sort of difficulty turns out, however, to be fully 
compatible (because coextensive) with ethical virtue’s general feasibility. Accordingly, 
Aristotle’s admission that ethical virtue is difficult, but still choiceworthy for its own sake, 
coheres with the Protrepticus’s appeal to easiness to defend philosophy’s 
choiceworthiness. For Aristotle thinks that both ethical virtue and philosophy are 
choiceworthy for their own sakes when they are generally feasible – a condition that is 
consistent with their also being “difficult” in the qualified sense of not being effortlessly 
simple. 
Whether Aristotle describes a given activity as “easy” or “difficult” depends on his 
sense of his audience. In Protrepticus 6, Aristotle faces an audience worried that 
philosophy is too difficult for mere mortals. In these circumstances, Aristotle’s exhortations 
encouragingly highlight philosophy’s easiness. In Nicomachean Ethics ii 9.1109a28-30, by 
contrast, Aristotle aims to articulate how we can best attain the intermediate in action. In 
this context, he emphasizes that this task is not effortlessly simple, for it requires some 
work. Moreover, it is work worth undertaking, given that virtue is fine and praiseworthy. 
In this way, Aristotle prepares his audience to take the steps necessary to attain virtue’s 
rewards.23 Yet having made this point, Aristotle promptly clarifies that virtue’s difficulty 
                                               
22 Connell 2018: 944 suggests that even if some people will, on Aristotle’s view, find 
becoming virtuous “more difficult,” becoming virtuous is a possibility “for a broad variety 
of humans.” 
23  Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 140.8-9 on 
Aristotle’s remarks on philosophy in Metaphysics a 1.993a20: “Thus his words might be 
understood as an exhortation to us: on the one hand, not to take this study lightly, in the 
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need not make the exercise of virtue overall burdensome or laborious. So, even here, 
Aristotle highlights ethical virtue’s general feasibility. Hence, Aristotle’s remarks on 
ethical virtue pose no problems for Aristotle’s appealing to easiness in a philosophical 
protreptic.24  
 
IV. Addressing the Normative Worry, Part (3): The Superiority of the Difficult? 
We still face part (3) of the obvious normative worry. How can Aristotle appeal to 
philosophy’s easiness in a protreptic given his claims in (a) Rhetoric i 7.1364a29 and (b) 
Topics iii 2.117b28-30? In these passages, it seems, Aristotle defends the superior value of 
what is difficult over what is easy. But his doing so apparently conflicts with the 
Protrepticus’ assumption that philosophy’s easiness somehow conduces to its 
choiceworthiness. 
In response, (a) Rhetoric i 7.1364a29 does identify what is more difficult as, in 
some sense, more valuable than what is easy. Again, (a) holds that what is more difficult 
is, in some way, “greater” than what is easy. Yet (a) does not necessarily identify what is 
more difficult as more choiceworthy than what is easy. For Aristotle immediately qualifies 
1364a29’s claim about the greater value of what is difficult. He affirms that, in another 
                                               
belief that it is altogether easy, but on the other hand not to abandon it as if it were altogether 
difficult” (trans. Dooley). 
24 In Topics viii 14.163b9-18, Aristotle indicates that one requires a certain natural ability 
for discerning the true and false, a power that contributes to our knowledge and 
philosophical wisdom (163b9-18). Yet Aristotle does not think that this point implies 
philosophy’s overall difficulty. (1) He affirms that, in general, human beings are 
“sufficiently suited by nature for the true, and for the most part happen upon the truth” 
(Rhetoric i 1.1355a15-17). (2) He suggests ways that pursuing philosophical truth as a 
collective enterprise can compensate for any limitations that we incur on account of our 
individual natural abilities (Metaphysics a 1.993a30-b5). To say more about how the 
collective character of philosophical inquiry on Aristotle’s view enables human beings 
successfully to attain philosophical truth, however, would require one actually to address 
Protrepticus 6’s actual arguments for the easiness of philosophy, in particular, the progress 
argument. See Walker forthcoming. 
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way, what is easy has greater value than what is difficult. For what is easy “holds as we 
wish” (e!xei ga_r w(v boulo&meqa: Rhet. i 7.1364a30).  
What is going on here? To square (a) with Aristotle’s apparent reversal in the very 
next line (1364a30), I contend that (a) attributes “greater” value to what is difficult, but 
only in a distinct and qualified way. More specifically, we should read (a) as holding only 
that what is more difficult to obtain is more valuable qua having a higher price than what 
is easy. So construed, (a) holds that what is more difficult to obtain (perhaps because it is 
rarer, and because this rarity imposes an impediment to acquisition) costs more than what 
is easy. Thus, (a) makes a plausible point: what is difficult to obtain is more expensive (with 
respect to time, painful effort, and external resources) than what is easy.25 But (a) need not 
imply that what is difficult is more choiceworthy than what is easy – especially for the 
agent who faces the labor and toil of acquiring what is difficult. From the perspective of 
such an agent, what is easy “holds as we wish”: for what is easy is not overall laborious or 
toilsome; and, rationally, we wish to avoid labor and toil as such.26 
 What about (b) Topics iii 2.1176b28-30? Initially, this passage is hard to decipher, 
for the text of (b) is missing both a comparison term and a verb. Hence, in the immediate 
context, (b) leaves unclear the precise sense in which the more difficult is more valuable 
than the easy. Still, I argue that (b) is open to a reading similar to (a) – a reading according 
to which Aristotle is simply highlighting the higher price of what is difficult. On this 
reading, just as what is more conspicuous has a higher price than what is less conspicuous, 
so too what is more difficult to obtain has a higher price than what is easy to obtain. When 
                                               
25  As Protrepticus 6, 40.15-41.2/B55-56 goes on to argue, philosophy is easy in not 
requiring an expenditure of time, painful effort, or resources. On X’s difficulty as consisting 
in X’s requiring a long time or painful effort, see Rhetoric i 6.1363a23-24. 
26  I adopt this thought from Cope (1877) 2009: 130-131, who suggests that Aristotle 
identifies what is difficult as more valuable than what is easy in respect of price. See also 
Aristotle’s remarks on gold in the preceding lines (1364a23-28). Gold, which is rare, has a 
higher price than iron, which is less rare. Yet what is less rare – water – is often more 
choiceworthy from the perspective of our using it. 
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Aristotle refers to what is “more conspicuous” (e)pifane&steron), I take him to refer to the 
kinds of limited-supply items that one might wish to show off. Given their rarity, such items 
are expensive, and obtaining them imposes special costs on us. Similarly, Aristotle 
suggests, what is difficult to obtain imposes special costs on us as well.   
Aristotle goes on in (b) to say that we “appreciate more” (ma~llon…a)gapw~men) 
having what is difficult to acquire. By making this claim, however, Aristotle may simply 
be reporting our natural response to obtaining what we acquire through labor. When people 
bear high costs and expenses in obtaining “the things coming about through labor” (ta_ 
epipo&nwv geno&mena), Aristotle notes in EN ix 7, all do, as a matter of psychological fact, 
have a special affection (ste&rgousin) for such items. Those who earn money appreciate it 
more than that who inherit it; mothers who suffer labor pains appreciate their children more 
than fathers do (1168a21-27; cf. Plato, Republic i 330c). In this way, at least, we do 
“appreciate more” what we have expended much effort to obtain. Yet again, these points 
about the high price of what is difficult do not entail that what is more difficult is more 
choiceworthy than what is easy. For as already noted, Rhetoric i 7.1364a30 points out that, 
ceteris paribus, we do wish to forego the labor and toil that the difficult imposes on us. 
Therefore, (a) and (b) do not pose problems for Aristotle’s argumentative strategy in 
Protrepticus 6. 
In conclusion, then, we have made progress in clarifying what precisely the 
Protrepticus’ easiness arguments aim to accomplish. And we have seen how Aristotle can 
respond to the obvious normative worry in its three facets. The apparent tensions between 
Aristotle’s appeal to philosophy’s easiness in the Protrepticus and his remarks on 
choiceworthiness and difficulty elsewhere can be relieved. Accordingly, we can begin to 
take up the generally feasible work – but not necessarily the unduly toilsome labor – 
required to examine Aristotle’s easiness arguments fully, and to explore the question with 
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which these arguments confront us: is philosophy, after all, easy for human beings as 
such?27 
 
Humanities Division (Philosophy) 




                                               
27 I have presented material from this paper at the Rutgers University Classics Department; 
the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy; the Ancient Philosophy Workshop at the 
University of Texas at Austin; the Nanyang Technological University Philosophy 
Department; the National University of Singapore Philosophy Department; the Pacific 
APA; the Workshop in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Oxford; “Philosophy in its 
Ancient Beginnings: On the Conceptualization, Criticism, and Justification of Philosophy 
in Antiquity” (a conference organized by Ronja Hildebrandt and Christopher Roser at 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin); and the University of Hong Kong Philosophy 
Department. I thank the audiences at these venues for their comments and suggestions. 
Among many in this group, I am particularly grateful to Matthew Evans, Gail Fine, Jessica 
Gelber, Monte Ransome Johnson, Andres Luco, Sara Protasi, and Franco Trivigno for their 
questions and comments. For helpful written feedback, I owe special thanks to Jerry Green 
(who challenged me to think harder about some of the normative worries this paper 
addresses), Verity Harte, D. S. Hutchinson, Brad Inwood, Neil Mehta, anonymous referees, 
and Ronald Polansky.  
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